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Forty turbulent years: How the Fraser Economic 
Commentary recorded the evolution of the modern 
Scottish economy 
 
Part 2: From recession to democratic renewal via privatisation and 
fading silicon dreams, 1991 ± 2000 
 
  Alf Young  
 
Abstract 
The recent economic history of Scotland, its performance and place within the UK and international 
economy can be traced through the pages of the Fraser of Allander Economic Commentary. Created in 
1975 by a private bequest from Sir Hugh Fraser, a prominent Scottish businessman, the Fraser of 
Allander Institute has provided a continuous commentary on the economic and related policy issues 
facing Scotland over the period. In this the fortieth anniversary of the Fraser of Allander Institute, this is 
the second of three articles which chart 6FRWODQG¶V transformation from an economy significantly based 
on manufacturing (and mining) to one that saw rapid deindustrialisation (in terms of output), the 
discovery of oil and the rapid transformation of its business base with the impact of both merger and 
acquisition (M&A) activity as well as the varied impacts of successive JRYHUQPHQWV¶ industrial and 
regional policies. 
For the UK as a whole, the recession foreseen by Dr John Hall, TSB 6FRWODQG¶V Treasury Economist, at 
the end of part one of this series, duly arrived. The Lawson boom of the late eighties had pushed 
inflation close to 10%. As chancellor, Nigel Lawson had tried to persuade Margaret Thatcher to take 
sterling into the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). All he managed was an informal 
shadowing, by value, of the Deutschmark. With the UK economy embarked on an unsustainable credit 
boom, interest rates hitting 15% and an inflationary wage spiral in full swing, it was left to /DZVRQ¶V 
successor as chancellor, John Major, to persuade an increasingly-beleaguered prime minister to 
formally join the ERM, in October 1990,  However a day - or rather, days - of reckoning still beckoned. 
Thatcher herself was ousted by her own party within weeks, with Major taking her place. The ERM 
experiment lasted less than two years, sterling crashing out under speculative pressure, on Black 
Wednesday, September 16, 1992. With commendable Scottish understatement, the then-chancellor, 
Norman Lamont, confessed it had been a ³GLIILFXOW GD\´  
In the first Fraser of Allander Economic Commentary of 1991, editor Jim Love noted ³$V late as 
November the Government was still denying there would be a recession, despite the mounting evidence 
to the contrary. The GDP figures for the third quarter of 1990 and provisional figures for the fourth 
quarter removed any lingering GRXEW´ (Vol. 16, No. 3) In previous recessions, the Scottish economy had 
taken its full share - sometimes more - of the resultant pain. And this time one of the last remaining 
mainstays of Scottish heavy industry, the Ravenscraig steel works in North Lanarkshire, was already 
under threat. In May 1990 British Steel had announced its intention to close the hot strip mill at the plant 
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in the first half of 1991. By the end of 1991 it went on to tell horrified Scottish ministers the rest of the 
complex, including its giant furnaces, would close too, in January 1992. Yet despite what was happening 
to 6FRWODQG¶V biggest steel plant, Jim Love questioned whether this recession would hit Scotland as hard 
as the rest of the UK. While recent evidence did not ³LQVSLUH much RSWLPLVP´ there were reasons for 
believing any falls in output north of the border were ³XQOLNHO\ to be of the scale experienced in the UK as 
a ZKROH´ Lower levels of borrowings by Scottish consumers left them more immune to high interest 
rates. Scotland had some export-intensive industries, like the burgeoning electronics sector in Silicon 
Glen, which were still enjoying growth in overseas demand. And the North Sea was going through a 
mini-boom in the wake of the first Gulf War.  
/RYH¶V contrarian prediction proved a shrewd one. For the UK as a whole the 1990/91 recession proved 
shallower than those of the mid-1970s and early 1980s. Overall, output contracted by 2.4% over five 
quarters and took twice that time to recover that loss in full. Yet, despite 5DYHQVFUDLJ¶V fate, the Scottish 
economy barely contracted at all. Another manufacturing sector, that cluster of modern electronic 
assembly plants, collectively known as Silicon Glen, was booming. Between the first quarter of 1991 and 
the first quarter of 1998 its collective output tripled. In part that was down to growing capacity, as more 
American, Japanese and other overseas corporations were persuaded to invest in Scotland. 
But Silicon *OHQ¶V competitiveness in these new digital export markets was also helped by the sharp 
depreciation of sterling that followed the 8.¶V abrupt departure from the ERM. The Fraser commentary 
had sensed that prospect too. ³2QH of the expected effects of ERM entry is to remove the µHDV\ RSWLRQ¶ 
of maintaining competitiveness by devaluation, and the government sees this as a means of imposing 
discipline on firms to keep costs - especially wage costs - GRZQ´ wrote its editor at the end of 1990. 
³(QWHULQJ the ERM at a fairly high rate and at a time of rising unit labour costs was bound to put a great 
deal of pressure on manufacturing industry, particularly those sectors geared towards exports which are 
crucial  to in providing an outlet for UK-produced goods at a time of faltering domestic demand. In the 
long-run the entry mid-point level of DM2.95 may prove XQVXVWDLQDEOH´ (Vol. 16, No. 2) 
While 6FRWODQG¶V economy, as a whole, emerged relatively unscathed from the early 1990s recession, its 
two biggest banks were not so fortunate. Injudicious lending at both the Royal Bank of Scotland and 
Bank of Scotland undermined profitability. Bank of Scotland had recorded pre-tax profits £194m in 1990. 
These fell sharply to £134m the following year before recovering marginally to £141m in 1992. In 1993 
they fell again to £125m. Its larger rival, RBS initially took a much more serious hit. Profits of £262m at 
the start of the decade fell 78% to £58m in 1991 and collapsed a further 64% to just £21m in 1992. By 
1993 RBS profits had rebounded to £265m. The Fraser commentary was alert to the dangers. ³)XHOOHG 
by poor lending decisions and consequent bad debts, the banks have an urgent need to cut costs if they 
are to restore profitability. The bad debts, although severe, do not appear to threaten the existence of 
the companies at present but they must inevitably raise questions about how banking is organised in the 
8.´ (Vol. 18, No. 2) 
Indeed RBS was already well embarked on an internal revolution in how it did business. George 
Mathewson, an expatriate engineer by training who had been running the Scottish Development Agency 
since 1981, had joined the Royal in October 1987 as director of strategy and development. By 1992, 
surrounded by a hand-picked group of former SDA colleagues he had taken with him, Mathewson was 
the 5R\DO¶V chief executive, implementing Project Columbus to root out the banking ³GHDG ZRRG´ he 
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thought was clogging the 5R\DO¶V decision making. Over at Bank of Scotland another unconventional 
banker, Peter Burt, who had started his business life in the computer industry, was taking over the 
leadership role. By the end of the decade these two men would lock horns over which of their banks 
would acquire the English clearer NatWest. The first seeds of what would eventually become the biggest 
banking crisis in UK banking history were already being sown. 
The SDA Mathewson left behind in 1987, to sort out RBS, was also approaching its political endgame. 
As we saw in Part 1, in 1988 Bill Hughes, a Scottish businessman with the ear of Margaret Thatcher, 
had proposed a much more balkanised model of economic development for Scotland, integrating skills 
training, stressing enterprise and innovation, and giving business people a much more powerful, 
localised voice in how the state helps grow an economy. Scottish Enterprise (SE), with its network of 
local enterprise companies (LECs), and its similarly configured northern counterpart, Highlands and 
Islands Enterprise (HIE),  which replaced the even older Highlands and Islands Development Board, first 
opened their doors at the beginning of April 1991. The man recruited to head SE was an ex-patriate Scot 
from &DOLIRUQLD¶V Silicon Valley, a human resources specialist called Crawford Beveridge. 
In the pages of the Fraser commentary, the advent of SE was greeted with plenty of healthy scepticism, 
notably from Neil Hood, Professor of Business Policy at Strathclyde Business School. (Vol. 16 Nos. 2 
and 3) Hood was also an insider who had been Director of Locate in Scotland from 1987-89 and then 
Director of Employment and Special Initiatives, SDA during the run up to its merger with the Training 
Agency in Scotland and the launch of SE.  He was concerned that, while in principle the SE core had 
been given a strong strategic role by ministers, the way its relationship with its network of 13 business-
led LECs developed in practice could leave it ³VWURQJ and SRZHUIXO´ or ³ZHDN and LPSRWHQW´ That SE 
core, he argued, should continue to be recognised as ³D national development agency in it own ULJKW´ 
Were it to become either a channel through which more localised funding and support was negotiated, 
or simply a facilitator of the work of the LECs, any strategic benefits from the reforms would soon be 
³IULWWHUHG DZD\´ 
There were plenty of early tensions between the SE core and its LEC network. In another contribution to 
the commentary, Keith Hayton of 6WUDWKFO\GH¶V Centre for Planning considered the local development 
pressures resulting from British 6WHHO¶V decision to close down its Ravenscraig site. Hayton cited one 
estimate of the funds needed by Lanarkshire Development $JHQF\¶V Chief Executive. It came to £650m 
spread over ten years! 6(¶V entire annual budget at the time was around £420m. ³,W is difficult to see 
funding on this scale being SURYLGHG´ he observed. ³$ more likely scenario is that money will be diverted 
from the other /(&V¶ budgets. It may be that those LECs that have below average unemployment levels 
will be particularly at ULVN´ (Vol. 16, No. 3) The more prosaic reality is that, more than twenty years after 
the event, much of the Ravenscraig site has yet to be redeveloped. 
Even in its formative years, under Crawford %HYHULGJH¶V leadership, Scottish Enterprise did manage to 
pursue some bold new national strategic goals. Swopping California for the west of Scotland, Beveridge 
quickly grew concerned about the relatively low rate of new business formation in his homeland, even 
compared with other parts of the UK. In 1993, at his instigation, SE launched its Business Birth Rate 
Strategy, designed to close that yawning enterprise gap. A whole suite of interventions were launched -  
from personal enterprise shows to new materials to support enterprise education in schools; new 
business network groups and funding forums; a higher education entrepreneurship programme and 
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mentoring support. The strategy had a target of helping create 25,000 new start-ups by the end of 1999. 
However when the Fraser of Allander Institute was commissioned to review the 6WUDWHJ\¶V impact over 
those seven years, it estimated the number of additional start-ups achieved was just 2124. At a cost of 
some £20m a year, the strategy had eaten up some £140m. And over its life, 6FRWODQG¶V business birth 
rate had actually fallen from 30.4 per 10,000 of the adult population (using VAT registration data) in 1993 
to just 27.5 by 1999. 
The political rationale behind creating Scottish (QWHUSULVH¶V devolved, business-led structure was that it 
would deliver better Scottish solutions to distinctively Scottish problems. However even Conservative 
governments of the 1980s and early 1990s could not resist the lure of prestigious international projects 
that promised large numbers of skilled jobs. Health Care International, a £180m private hospital, built on 
derelict industrial land on the north bank of the River Clyde between Clydebank and Dalmuir, was the 
showpiece project of that type, when it opened in June 1994. The brainchild of two Boston-based 
doctors, Ray Levey and Angelo Eraklis, the 260-bed HCI offered advanced medical treatments to 
patients from southern Europe, North Africa and the Middle East. Costs would be met by their own 
health systems or out of their own pockets. The complex incorporated a four star hotel so that relatives 
could travel to Scotland to be with patients. The project had started under the old SDA which spent £7m 
clearing asbestos and other pollutants from the site. SE invested in the hospital, alongside its builder, 
John Laing, British Aerospace, an investment arm of Harvard University and a consortium of Dutch, 
French and UK banks (including 6FRWODQG¶V RBS).  
Less than three months after its official opening, at least one of +&,¶V banks (IMG) was already very 
nervous. Only 400 of the promised 1800 jobs had been created. Patient numbers had fallen even more 
dramatically behind forecasts. Peak bed occupancy at that stage barely topped twenty. The Scottish 
Office and the Bank of England cracked the whip and support payments, from public sources and from 
the banking consortium, were accelerated. But to no avail. By November 1994 HCI had called in the 
receivers. In early 1995, the assets were acquired by the London-based Abu Dhabi Investment 
Company and the hospital relaunched with fresh investment and a plan to treat a steady stream of 
patients from the Emirate. But even this intervention, involving a son of Abu 'KDEL¶V crown prince, did 
not resolve +&,¶V destiny. Increasingly it was used to treat urgent NHS cases from across the UK. In 
2002 it was acquired outright by NHS Scotland to help address lengthening waiting times and is now the 
Golden Jubilee National Hospital, specialising in heart and lung treatments, but also carrying out a 
significant proportion on orthopaedic procedures for NHS patients from across Scotland. 
What happened to HCI in the 1990s - a state-supported private health care initiative being turned on its 
head, through abject market failure, into much-needed additional capacity for 6FRWODQG¶V domestic state-
provided health service - ran completely counter to what successive Conservative governments thought 
they were about at that time. Privatisation of state assets and utilities was one of the defining drivers of 
the Thatcher and Major years. British Telecom and British Gas were sold to the public in 1984 and 1986 
respectively. British Airways and water supply, in England and Wales, were disposed of too. While the 
HCI hospital was being built it was still full steam ahead on privatisation. In 1991 the Scottish Bus Group 
was privatised. At the beginning of 1993, the process of breaking British Rail up started, replacing it with 
a track, signals and stations operator; a series of privatised regional train operating companies, including 
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ScotRail; and three rolling stock leasing companies. the first of these three groups, Railtrack, was 
effectively renationalised after the Hatfield Rail Crash in 2000 and is now Network Rail. 
In 1991 along with the rest of the UK electricity supply industry, shares in 6FRWODQG¶V electricity suppliers 
were offered to the public. However there was room for a specifically Scottish solution for those parts of 
the network operating north of +DUGLDQ¶V Wall. Both the South of Scotland Electricity Board (SSEB) and 
the North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board were privatised as vertically-integrated businesses - Scottish 
Power and Scottish Hydro-Electric respectively - controlling everything from generation and transmission 
to distribution and supply in their designated areas. Only 66(%¶V nuclear assets were ring-fenced from 
the sale, later to be merged into British Energy and sold to the French utility EDF. In England and Wales 
the old Central Electricity Generating Board was broken up into four - a National Grid company, 
responsible for the entire high voltage transmission system south of the border and three electricity 
generators, National Power, Powergen and Nuclear Electric (later British Energy). In addition twelve 
regional electricity companies were created, responsible for distribution and supply in their areas. 
Even before the privatisation process was complete, the commentary was noting (Vol. 15, No.4 and Vol. 
16, No.1) that both Scottish companies had much to gain by exporting more of their excess power south 
and exploring new collaborative generating opportunities and commercial supply deals there too. As the 
post-privatisation environment matured, both Scottish companies exploited their integrated structure to 
acquire regional supply companies over the border and develop their generating capacity there too. 
Hydro-Electric, now SSE, after its 1998 merger with Southern Electric, remains a listed company, 
headquartered in Perth. Scottish Power was acquired by the Spanish group Iberdrola in 2007. Like all 
their main competitors, SSE and ScottishPower now supply gas as well as electricity. Today, of the six 
biggest players, two are German-owned, one French and one Spanish. Only SSE and British Gas 
(owned by Centrica) remain in UK ownership. 
What happened to the electricity sector through privatisation has left one competitive wrinkle, causing 
tensions to this day. National Grid still owns the high-voltage network south of the border. Under BETTA 
(the British Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangements), it is also the system operator for the 
entire UK-wide high-voltage grid. In effect it regulates flows of electricity around the whole UK and the 
terms under which these flows take place. However National Grid is a major commercial player in that 
market, just like SSE and Spanish-owned Scottish Power, who still own and operate their own parts of 
the high-voltage wires in Scotland. So when it comes to moving away from fossil fuel generation towards 
greener forms of generation (most notably onshore wind) there is growing political tension. 
Scotland wants to export as much green electricity south as it can. But its own baseload generating 
capacity is diminishing, now that Scottish Power is closing its massive coal-fired Longannet station next 
March. And no one, not even Scottish Power or SSE, seems interested in building new base-load 
capacity north of the border. The SNP-controlled devolved Scottish government has an embargo on any 
new nuclear generating capacity here too. And now the new majority Conservative government at 
Westminster is talking about cutting back on subsidies for renewable generators, like onshore wind 
farms. The future of BETTA, which the SNP, in its 2014 6FRWODQG¶V Future white paper, said it would 
continue to support, were Scotland to vote yes to independence, looks like becoming a growing source 
of political friction between Edinburgh and London over the next few years. 
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While the final decade of the 20th century was marked, right across the UK, by a very significant re-
drawing of the boundaries between what the state could best provide and what should be vested in 
market competition, it was also a time of significant political and constitutional upheaval, especially in 
Scotland. In 1994 the Major government legislated to abolish the two-tier structure of regions and 
districts across Scotland, introduced in the 1970s, and replace them with 32 unitary authorities. When 
the new Act came into force in 1995, the vast Strathclyde Region, centred on the City of Glasgow and 
the Clyde estuary, was no more. Water and sewerage services were taken away from local democratic 
control. However in the wake of a political campaign which included a µZDWHU UHIHUHQGXP¶ organised by 
Strathclyde Region, the Conservative government baulked at privatising these services the way it had in 
England and Wales. Instead three public water and sewerage authorities were created, covering the 
west, east and north of the country. In 2002 these would be merged into a single body, Scottish Water, 
created by an act of the new devolved Scottish parliament. 
Against all the predicted odds, the Major government had retained power in the 1992 UK general 
election. That gave it a mandate to continue to pursue its wide-ranging programme of privatisation and 
advance the wholesale restructuring of the architecture of the British state. But as the next general 
election loomed, in 1997, there were growing signs that eighteen years of Tory rule were coming to an 
end. The choice facing voters was particularly acute in Scotland, where the Labour opposition, now 
under Tony %ODLU¶V leadership, was committed to holding another referendum on Scottish home rule and 
- if it proved to be the settled will of the Scottish people - the creation of a devolved Scottish parliament 
in Edinburgh for the first time since the Act of Union in 1707. 
A month before the 1992 general election, the Scottish Office published, for the very first time, what its 
press release of the time rather prosaically called a ³ERRNOHW´ on Government Expenditure and Revenues 
in Scotland. ³,Q reading this booklet, the people of Scotland will be able to judge for themselves the 
extent to which Scotland derives economic benefit from being a part of the United .LQJGRP´ explained 
Ian Lang, the Secretary of State for Scotland at the time. That first booklet showed total public 
expenditure per head in Scotland just over 12% higher than in the UK as a whole, and identifiable 
general government expenditure 19% higher than its UK equivalent and 24% higher than in England. On 
the revenue side, over the four main classes of revenue raised in Scotland - income tax, national 
insurance, VAT and local authority revenue - 6FRWODQG¶V contribution was below its population share. ³,Q 
VKRUW´ claimed Lang, ³ZH contribute less than our population share to the UK Exchequer, and receive 
more from LW´ 
That analysis, now known universally by its acronym GERS, has appeared annually ever since. It has 
been refined. Since the start it has been the work of Scottish civil servants. It has proved contentious 
and sometimes inflammatory fuel for the ongoing political debate about 6FRWODQG¶V constitutional future. 
A strong flavour of that controversy is evident in three linked pieces which appeared in the Fraser 
commentary in 1997 (Vol. 22, No. 3). The first is a comment on the SNP Budget for Scotland by the 
,QVWLWXWH¶V Jim Stevens. The second is a riposte by Andrew Wilson, an economist, speaking for the SNP, 
later a list MSP for the party in the very first Scottish devolved parliament. The final piece is an analysis 
of the SNP budget, which formed part of the SDUW\¶V manifesto for the 1997 UK general election, by Peter 
Wood, of the independent Scottish consultancy group Pieda. Intriguingly the pieces only appeared in the 
June edition of the commentary, six weeks after the votes cast on May 1 had been counted and Labour 
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had swept to power with a 179-seat majority. The SNP had doubled its Scottish seats tally from three to 
six. 
Stevens based some of his analysis on the latest GERS figures. He rejected the charge that, by doing 
so, he was accepting ³7RU\ fiddled ILJXUHV´ That was a ³SXHULOH slur on the professional integrity of 
government HFRQRPLVWV´ The 613¶V view of our fiscal prospects, Stevens concluded, was ³OXGLFURXVO\ 
optimistic and fatally IODZHG´ Oil revenues would endure for a long time ³EXW on a declining trend and 
would not be sufficient to ensure that we did not have to borrow more or tax more to enjoy the same 
level of public services that we would have enjoyed inside the 8QLRQ´ If we are to opt for independence, 
he went on, ³,W will not be an easy ride and we should only do so with our eyes wide open. Suspect and 
inaccurate appraisals of our fiscal prospects are about as much use in the Scottish constitutional debate 
.... as a chocolate ILUHJXDUG´ 
:LOVRQ¶V response, on behalf of the SNP, GLGQ¶W pull any punches either. He opened by recalling that, in 
1970, David Simpson and Kenneth Alexander had contributed essays to an OUP book, respectively for 
and against the economic case for Scottish independence. Simpson was the founder director of the FAI 
and Alexander professor of economics at Strathclyde. Alexander was, Wilson quipped, in ³WKH grey 
FRUQHU´ while Simpson occupied ³WKH sunshine FRUQHU´ Clearly the gloves were off. 6FRWODQG¶V inherited 
fiscal position on independence, Wilson argued, ³LV of less importance to the economics of 
independence than the dynamics. It is not the starting point but what happens through time that is of 
greater LPSRUWDQFH´ If an independent government proved better for the Scottish economy than London 
government, delivering faster growth and releasing latent enterprise, then any initial fiscal deficit would 
quickly diminish. 6WHYHQV¶V contribution to the debate was ³ZHOFRPH´ But it contained ³XQVXVWDLQDEOH 
arguments couched in pejorative ODQJXDJH¶ 
It was left to Peter Wood of Pieda to offer a view from outside the ring. ³)HZ if any, economists would 
dispute that Scotland would be economically viable as an independent FRXQWU\´ he observed. ³,W is quite 
evident that 6FRWODQG¶V economy is larger, more prosperous and more soundly based than many existing 
independent states. However there is much less agreement as to whether an independent Scotland 
would be more or less prosperous than a Scotland which remained within the 8.´ He went on to point 
out that the budget the SNP proposed involved spending increases that, by 2001, would push 6FRWODQG¶V 
budget deficit to almost £7bn, or nearly 10% of GDP. ³:LWK some determined belt tightening in terms of 
reduced public spending and/or tax LQFUHDVHV´ an independent Scotland could reach the Maastricht 
criteria for joining European Monetary Union. Whether it might become another Celtic Tiger in the longer 
term was, Wood judged, ³IDU less FHUWDLQ´ And the idea that independence would deliver an instant 
public spending bonus he dismissed as ³XQWHQDEOH´ 
The really striking thing about these exchanges, reading them again now in 2015, is how little has been 
resolved in this core economic argument about 6FRWODQG¶V constitutional future over the eighteen years 
since they took place. Next year the devolved Scottish parliament and government will complete its 
fourth full term. We have had a referendum on Scottish independence where the yes side lost by a 
margin of more than ten percentage points. We have had another UK general election in which the SNP 
swept the board in Scotland in unprecedented fashion. The Smith Commission proposals have led to 
another Scotland Bill, offering more devolved fiscal powers to Edinburgh, currently being debated at 
Westminster. But, in tone, texture and temper, the economic arguments for and against further 
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constitutional change seem as entrenched and unresolved as ever they were. Even debates about the 
prospect of something short of outright independence - full fiscal autonomy within the existing Union - 
suffers from the same statistical trench warfare. 
In the final years of the old century, constitutional preoccupations were more about whether Scotland 
would vote for the new devolved parliament Labour had promised and whether Scots would also vote to 
give that parliament modest powers over tax. Labour, led by Tony Blair, won its huge 1997 majority in 
part on a pledge of strict fiscal rectitude. %ODLU¶V chancellor, Gordon Brown, would stick, for their first two 
years in office, with the same tight spending plans already set by the outgoing Tory administration. Even 
%URZQ¶V Treasury predecessor, Ken Clarke, later admitted he GLGQ¶W really think his party could have 
delivered on those legacy spending plans had they won. But Brown stuck with &ODUNH¶V hair shirt. In each 
of its first three years in office, New Labour generated increasingly large budget surpluses, thanks to that 
squeeze on public spending. Such budget surpluses had only happened in four other years since the 
mid-sixties. For the vast majority of the past half century, annual budget deficits have been the norm in 
the UK whoever was in power. Against that backdrop, it is no surprise that the modest fiscal powers 
vested in the new parliament in Edinburgh in 1999 - to vary the basic rate of income tax up or down by 
up to three pence in the pound - has withered unused on the fiscal vine ever since. 
As the new millennium approached, did that tight squeeze on public spending have any significant 
impact on the real economy on terms of output and jobs? As we have seen, the 1990s had started with 
the Scottish economy narrowly escaping the recession that hit the rest of the UK. At the start of the 
decade unemployment, in both Scotland and the UK as a whole, had been on a downward trend for 
nearly three years. The Scottish jobless rate, while not as far adrift as it had been at the end of the 
1970s, was still a full three percentage points higher than the UK equivalent. However that gap narrowed 
when the recession was felt more keenly south of the border. 6FRWODQG¶V unemployment rate even 
dipped below the UK rate in 1992/3 and stayed much the same until the middle of the decade. Then it 
began to drift higher again. 
Two contrasting forces were at work. 6FRWODQG¶V push to attract more electronics assembly plants to its 
shores appeared, for much of the decade, to be paying dividends. Successive Fraser commentaries 
charted the way output from Scottish manufacturing plants caught up with equivalent UK output by late 
1994, then to soar higher right through to the end of the decade. 7KHUH¶V a chart on page 7 of the 
January 2000 edition (Vol. 25, No. 1) that captures that clear trend. However New LaERXU¶V squeeze on 
public spending was also having its impact, in sectors where the Scottish economy was already more 
dependent, in employment terms, than its southern counterpart. On top of that, there were already clear 
signs, despite that soaring manufacturing output, that the silicon dreams fostered in Scotland through 
the 1980s and 1990s might be beginning to fade. 
Motorola had built a massive complex to assemble mobile phones at Bathgate  which opened in 1990 
and employed more than 3000 people. By 2001 it was closing down and shipping the assembly work off 
to cheaper host economies in eastern Europe. In 1996 the Taiwanese group Chungwha arrived at 
Mossend in Lanarkshire promising even more jobs, 3300, assembling cathode ray tubes. But that was 
yesterday¶V technology. The advent of flat screens changed all that and Chungwha was gone in six 
years. The Korean group Hyundai agreed to come to Fife to fabricate silicon chips. A hugely expensive 
wafer fab was built, with lots of support from Scottish Enterprise and government. But Hyundai changed 
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its mind. And with other established wafer fabs, like the Japanese group 1(&¶V plant at Livingston, also 
closing. the Fife site never produced a single wafer. It has since been demolished. 
The Outlook and Appraisal in the last Fraser commentary of 2000 ( Vol. 25, No. 4) caught the mood. 
³7KH Scottish economy experienced a further contraction in output in the first quarter of the year. Growth 
was considerably weaker than in the 8.´ it noted. ³7KH service sector exhibited no growth, while 
manufacturing output fell markedly..... the fall in electronics output appears to be a key reason for the 
overall ZHDNQHVV´ Some in the Scottish media were already talking of another recession. The Fraser 
team disagreed. But with trouble in Silicon Glen, a stronger pound hitting exports and growth in public 
expenditure tightly constrained, the new century was starting on an uncertain note. In the final part of 
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